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Abstract: Soviet historiography discusses the People’s War during the Second World War, the
idea that all of the Soviet people rallied to the cause and fought off the Nazi invaders, but this is
far from the truth. Within the western borderlands of the Soviet Union multiple conflicting
groups fought for control of and support from the people. This was especially true in Ukraine
where the German Army, Soviet Partisans and Ukrainian nationalists all fought ‘for the people’
and for their own ideologies. This paper is an attempt to discuss the ideological conflict between
the Nazis, the Soviets, and the Ukrainian nationalists, and how the failure or success of these
policies led to the legitimizing of policies of mass murder of the local Ukrainian, Jewish, and
Polish populations, and how the tension from the partisan struggle continues to this day.
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Introduction
Partisan warfare was not a phenomenon unique to Soviet lands during World War II, but
it was in this region that partisans played the largest role in the conflict. Partisans both changed
the nature of warfare on the eastern front and were transformed by this same conflict. Who
constituted a partisan depended largely on who was asked. Soviets considered partisans as those
who were under their central control. The Nazi categorization of partisans was much broader,
constituting anyone who was a Jew, harbored partisans, was a partisan, or in general obstructed
Nazi policy. 1 As the war progressed and ideology became more crucial to supporting Nazi war
efforts, the category of partisan became increasingly convoluted, leading to mass murders of
Soviet citizens across the front. Neither the Nazis nor the Soviets supported “independent”
partisans or nationalist groups. Independent groups were often integrated into the larger groups,
but nationalist groups fought for their own independence leading to permanent conflict with the
Soviets and a much more complicated policy towards the Nazis.
Beginning as early as the days following the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union on June
22, 1941, small pockets of independent resistance formed against German occupation, but it was
not until early spring 1942 that organized resistance behind the front lines began to be
coordinated by the Soviet central command. Pro-Soviet partisans were far from the only troops
fighting behind the front line though. Independent partisan groups continued to operate; they
were often comprised of Jewish individuals who were attacked and repressed by both Soviet and
Nazi forces. Nationalist groups, such as the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the Russian
National Liberation Army (RONA), also combatted pro-Soviet and pro-Nazi groups, though

1

Omer Bartov, Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992), 89.

4

their resistance was much greater against pro-Soviet forces, in line with their fight for
independence from the Soviet Union. 2
In the early stages of the war, from Operation Barbarossa to the Battle of Kursk in July
1943, Soviet partisans struggled in Ukraine because of their inability to connect with local
populations, who often harbored anti-Soviet sentiments. Soviet partisans were also unable to
receive supplies from the Soviet government, which itself struggled to turn around the Nazi
offensive. Even after July 1943 and the beginning of the Soviet drive towards Berlin, the Soviet
partisans continued to struggle to achieve both their ideological and military objectives. The
increasing anti-partisan efforts of the retreating Nazi forces along with the growing strength of
Ukrainian independence groups, who fought Soviet troops for years after the end of World War
II in 1945, hindered pro-Soviet partisan efforts. As the war dragged on, ideology increasingly
became a foundation for mass murders of the Ukrainian population. All three groups—
Nationalists, Nazis, and Soviets—attempted to convince the population that they were fighting
for the good of the people, but all three groups murdered the same people they were supposedly
protecting. As all three groups battled for the “people”, it was the people who suffered the most.
Mass executions, torching of villages, scorched-earth policies, labor requisitions, rape, and
looting of the local population became common events in western Ukraine during World War II.
Anti-Soviet sentiments and the failure of Soviet partisans to connect with the people due
to the failure of centralized Soviet policy, Nazi anti-partisan activity and its increasingly
aggressive nature throughout the war, and the success of nationalist Ukrainian partisan groups
who continued to combat Soviet forces into 1949 are all factors to be understood in the context
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of the ideological battle waged in Ukraine during World War II. This ideological battle between
Soviet, Nazi, and Ukrainian nationalist ideologies, and the distortion of the conflicting ideologies
allowed for the mass murder and repression of the Ukrainian population by Soviet partisans, the
Nazi occupiers, and the Ukrainian nationalists.
Ultimately, this paper will attempt to understand how ideological conflict between the
Nazis, the Soviets, and Ukrainian nationalists “legitimized” mass murder and other repressive
means against the local population, how regional and ethnic tensions within Ukraine were
exacerbated by the Nazi invasion in 1941, and how to some extent these tensions continue to this
day within Ukraine in the struggle over the legacy of the partisan struggle during World War II.

3

Fig. 1: Forested areas of Ukraine in 1941
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Alexander Gogun, Stalin’s Commandos: Ukrainian Partisan Forces on the Eastern Front (New
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Historiography
The historiography of partisan movements on the Eastern Front has been dictated in large
part by nationalistic narratives of the Soviet Union pre-1991 and of both Russia and Ukraine in
the post-Soviet period. The Cold War period offered a more or less homogenous view of
partisans as groups of Russians organized and centralized under the Soviet government and
fighting for the liberation of the working classes in occupied territory. Works such as the Great
Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945: A General Outline, written within the USSR,
supported this Soviet narrative of class struggle with claims such as, “the fight for liberation
against the invader merged increasingly with the people’s struggle against the exploiting
classes.” 4 Much of the work from the period was dominated by Soviet historians, whereas
western historians wrote little more than handbooks on the military tactics of Soviet partisan and
German forces for the U.S. military. 5 On top of the Soviet historians’ domination of the
historiographical discussion, other partisan groups who operated outside of Soviet control were
covered up or removed from records and histories. In his memoir A Voice from the Forest:
Memoirs of a Jewish Partisan, Nahum Kohn recalled the absence of his Jewish partisan groups
from the official records. Although his actions during his time under Soviet control were
recorded, “the Soviet authorities refused to include his eighteen-man Jewish group in the
record.” 6
Even in the post-Soviet period many historians, especially within the newly independent
Ukraine, pushed nationalistic narratives of the partisan conflict. The revival of Stepan Bandera,
4
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leader of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, as a national hero of Ukraine is one of the major
examples of transforming the actions of partisans to fit a specific nationalist narrative. Bandera,
long considered a Nazi collaborator and traitor to the Soviet cause, has since been restored, in the
minds of many, as a hero of the Ukraine. 7 The whitewashing of crimes in favor of national
heroes remains a problematic aspect of the historiography on partisan activity. The “need” to
justify the historic narrative of specific states, increasingly important in post-Soviet Eastern
Europe, has allowed for the revival and support of an individual who, “regarded Russia as the
principle enemy of Ukraine…showed little tolerance for…Poles and Jews…and [was willing] to
abandon all principles to attain the goal of an independent Ukraine.” 8
Although nationalist narratives have remained a large part of the historiography, the postSoviet period has also seen a proliferation of memoirs by Jewish partisans and works attempting
to counter the basic Cold War era assumptions created by the pro-Soviet narrative. Works such
as those by Nahum Kohn, Harold Zissman, and the popularity of the Bielski brothers’ story in
popular culture are all a small portion of the numerous works and memoirs written by partisans
who had been left out of the official Soviet records and narrative. 9 Along with the increased
number of memoirs written, an attempt has been made to remove the narrative from the grip of
the conflict between nationalist considerations. One of the most successful attempts was by
Timothy Snyder. His work Bloodlands: Europe between Stalin and Hitler, focused on Ukraine,
Belarus, Poland, and the Baltic states, and the horrors witnessed by the populations of these lands
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at the hands of both Nazi and Soviet authorities. In one chapter discussing partisan groups in
Belarus, as throughout the entire book, Snyder breaks this image of Soviet partisans as protectors
of the people. In fact, Snyder completely overturns this myth in many regards. Throughout the
chapter Snyder writes that Soviet partisan units in Belarus often turned away or killed Jews who
attempted to join units, showed little regard for the rights and lives of women, by the end of the
war were populated by many of the same individuals who had acted as local auxiliary forces for
the Nazis, and were the killers of tens of thousands of fellow Belarussians. 10 Snyder, along with
other historians in the post-Soviet period, has worked to complicate the narrative made popular
by Soviet historians and Ukrainian historians in the name of their national histories.
The present work will not go so far as Snyder in its criticism of partisan fighters, but it
will be an attempt to better understand the interactions between the different movements in
western Ukraine, and how it led to the mass murder of the local population. In the past, historians
have discussed the Soviet partisan movement, memoirs and other works have discussed the
independent groups and nationalist Ukrainian groups, and more recent works such as those by
Snyder have dissected interactions between the Nazis and the partisan forces. Minimal work
though has been completed in understanding the interactions between pro-Soviet partisans, proUkrainian partisans, and the German military and the underlying historical, military, and
ideological factors that created the diverse landscape of support and conflict in Ukraine. This
paper will be the start of a discussion on these interactions, their causes, and their overall impact
on the Eastern Front and Ukrainian national identity in the post-1945 and post-Soviet periods.

10
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Ukraine in the Russian Civil War and Ukrainian Famine
Relations between Ukraine/Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Soviet Union
central leadership from 1917 onwards were often not cordial and the creation of nationalist
Ukrainian armies during World War II was not the first time Ukrainians had fought against
Russian aggression in the twentieth century. The strong anti-Soviet sentiments encountered in
Ukrainian territory at the start of World War II can be attributed to multiple events earlier in the
twentieth-century, most prominently the Russian Civil War and the Ukrainian famine.
Although involving many diverse interests, the Russian Civil War, which began in 1917,
was a conflict between the Bolshevik-led Red Army and the White Armies of those still loyal to
the Russian Empire or the democratic interests of the provisional government. For a majority of
the Russian Civil War, Ukraine was independent of the emerging Soviet Union. The Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk, ratified in March 1918 and signed between Germany and the Bolsheviks, formally
ended Russian involvement in World War I. The treaty forced the Bolsheviks to cede most of the
European land controlled by Russia which later became the independent states of Finland,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine. 11 Many in Ukraine wanted to keep their newly
independent state separate from Russia. Ukraine was largely a peasant population. An 1897
census record reveals that close to ninety percent of the Ukrainian population was in the peasant
class. 12 With a population overwhelmingly Ukrainian and peasant, Russians were viewed as
oppressive outsiders, who “were heavily represented among the principal landowners.” 13
Support for Ukrainian nationalist parties in elections, ukrainianization of education, religion, and
governance and rise of organizations promoting Ukrainian autonomy portrayed a country that
11

S.L.A. Marshall, World War I (New York: Mariner Books, 2001), 327-334.
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wanted to remain free from Soviet, and more importantly Russian, control. Unfortunately,
national autonomy did not materialize in this period. The small elite classes, mainly Russian
bureaucrats, landowners, and industrialists (a group that also contained many Jews), focused in
the major cities such as Kiev, supported reintegration with Russia and by 1921 the Bolsheviks
had regained control of the Ukrainian heartland. 14 The same peasants who supported Ukrainian
independence during the Russian Civil War would become victims of Soviet policy little more
than a decade later. Only a few years after the Russian Civil War ended in 1922, Lenin passed
away and by the end of the 1920s Joseph Stalin was in firm control of the Soviet state. 15
Stalin enacted a policy not only directed at ending calls for autonomy but also attempting
to destroy any notions of Ukrainian nationalism. Stalin’s policy of central control meant the
collectivization of agriculture. Grain requisitions required by the state were unable to be met by
the Ukrainian countryside, which struggled with poor weather, pests, lack of livestock and tractor
equipment, deportation of the best farmers, and refusal by peasants to work. 16 Although it was
clear that many factors caused the inability of peasants to meet the grain quotas, Stalin declared
it political sabotage by local authorities, Ukrainian nationalists, and, the kulaks (rich peasant
classes), who intentionally were withholding grain from the state authority. 17 There were many
responses the Soviet state could have taken to shield the population from starvation, but it
deliberately ignored all attempts to protect the Ukrainian peasants. Snyder considers seven
different policy actions that reveal the Ukrainian famine to be a result of intentional and lethal
policies intended to kill the Ukrainian peasantry. These seven policies included: seizure of grain
surpluses in prosperous areas to meet the overall quota; peasants who were unable to meet the
14
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quota had to pay higher taxes on meat; grain quotas were raised for farms unable to meet the
original demand; mass arrests of Ukrainian communist leaders; continued setting of quotas
during the famine; sealing off the Ukrainian borders and issuing internal passports; and the
seizure of seed grain needed to plant future yields. 18 These policies led to the intentional
starvation of the Ukrainian peasantry and the death of an estimated three million people. These
blatant policies of starvation along with the arrest of the Ukrainian elite resulted in what Snyder
considers the death of Ukrainian autonomy and the removal of Ukrainian identity. 19 In this
regard, it is possible to argue with Snyder and suggest that it was not the death of Ukrainian
nationalism and identity, but rather the rise of anti-Soviet attitudes throughout the populace.
Instead of destroying autonomous thought, Stalin’s policies caused greater support for
autonomous action from a population that viewed its own government as outsiders. The recent
history of Ukrainian autonomy during the Russian Civil War, along with Stalinist policies of
mass murder in the 1930s, created a populace that despised the Soviet government and allowed
for the rise of nationalist groups and independent partisan groups during the war that were just as
likely to fight the Soviets as they were the Nazis.
Along with a recent history of oppression that created an anti-Soviet atmosphere, Ukraine
also had a history of anti-Semitism. Nationalist groups such as the OUN (Organization of
Ukrainian Nationalists) referred to the “Polish-Jewish-Russian capitalists and landowners.” 20
This was very similar to the Nazi creation of the Judeo-Bolshevik threat. Ukrainian territory had
also witnessed major pogroms during the Russian Civil War. During occupation of western
territories by white armies, it has been estimated that between 100,000 and 200,000 Jews were
18
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murdered in western Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine throughout the Russian Civil War, often for
the suggestion that they “had welcomed the Bolsheviks with joy.” 21 Mass murder was committed
by both Red and White troops, who perceived themselves as threatened by ethnic and ideological
enemies and commanders on both sides were unwilling to stop their troops. General Denikin,
commander of the White Army in Ukraine, was revolted by the pogroms but “did not want to
appear pro-Jewish.” Lenin’s response to the murder of Jews was little more than a mild
reprimand. 22 Attacks on Jews had been common in recent Ukrainian history, and there were
many Ukrainians, both nationalist and otherwise, who were suspicious of ethnic outsiders,
including Jews, Poles, and Russians, who would have considered the murder of Jews for political
ends a common and perhaps acceptable means of conducting political policy during wartime. 23

Soviet Partisans as an Extension of Soviet Policy
Anti-Soviet attitudes throughout Ukraine made it difficult for a partisan effort centralized
from Moscow to be effective. The overall Soviet partisan movement was not unified under
central command in Moscow until early 1942. From the beginning of the Second World War,
however, Moscow airdropped specialists into occupied territory. Often personnel who worked
for the party, state, or NKVD and had fled from the territory under Nazi occupation were

21
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reinserted into these territories to form partisan groups. 24 Nahum Kohn, a Jewish partisan
embedded in the overall Soviet partisan command structure, wrote on the origin of his partisan
army as being, “a group of twenty men parachuted from Moscow…another group was soon
parachuted there, and it was followed by a third group and a fourth.” 25 These inserted groups
would become the core leadership of most Moscow-controlled partisan organizations. Almost
like Special Forces, these small task forces were inserted to create the ideological and military
conditions necessary for the start of guerilla-style conflict. 26 In a country where anti-Soviet
sentiments were strong and most ethnicities other than Ukrainian considered enemies, the local
populace would have resented the formation of leadership cores made up of ethnic Russians
controlled by Moscow, which did little to help support these partisan efforts in the early years.
Along with distrust from the local populace, the Red Army was unprepared for the initial
Nazi offensive. The encirclement of over one million Soviet troops in the early weeks of the war,
such as pockets formed around Kiev and Bryansk, and the subsequent break down of these
pockets caused a massive number of Red Army soldiers to flee into forested areas in the region.
Many of these soldiers fled for fear of Nazi captivity or hope for a Soviet victory. They formed
or joined pro-Soviet partisan groups in hopes of continuing their service to the Motherland. 27
The overall number of former Red Army soldiers within the partisan movement has been an
issue of contention among historians and in official Soviet records. While some historians have
suggested that throughout the war former Red Army soldiers made up around forty percent of the
partisan strength, with numbers as high as sixty percent in 1941, Soviet and Russian sources
24
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have suggested the number to be closer to eleven percent, most likely attempting to protect the
myth that the partisan struggle was truly a spontaneous people’s struggle against fascist
occupation. 28 This creates a major problem for understanding the true nature of the partisan
conflict in Ukraine. Were the people involved in the ‘People’s War’ or is it a myth of Soviet
historiography? While Soviet authorities and historians have created this myth of the people’s
involvement in liberation from Nazi occupation, and it might hold true in ethnic Russian
territory, it would seem that in many of the borderland regions the local populations had little
interest in supporting Soviet partisan efforts.
These early partisan units proved to be extremely ineffective in combatting the first
German offensives in the latter half of 1941 and early 1942. The destruction battalions formed by
the NKVD (units formed for the purpose of sabotage in occupied areas) were often quickly
thrown together and the few home guard battalions formed from the population had little to no
supplies and had zero expertise in combat. Many attacks conducted by partisan groups were
often scattered and of little strategic importance, with raids confined mainly to small areas near
forests instead of on major supply centers captured by the Nazis. 29 Many of the units, even the
NKVD formed destruction battalions, were ill-equipped. Most of the Moscow-formed battalions
and all of the home guard units lacked basic weaponry necessary for guerrilla-style warfare.
They had little to no automatic weaponry and anti-tank weapons; they instead had to rely on
Molotov cocktails to attack heavily-armored vehicles. 30 This made many of the early missions
suicide for undertrained and underequipped units. Panteleimon Ponomarenko, head of the
Central Staff of the Partisan Movement (TsSHPD) formed in 1942 to oversee partisan warfare,
28
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even admitted to Stalin in February 1943 that up until that point overall partisan actions across
the occupation zones had “still not reached such an extent as to have operational impact on the
German front line.” 31 Lack of equipment, little to no training, and failure of organization were
only some of the partisan organizations’ problems.
The largest problem for pro-Soviet partisan action in the first two years of the war was
the lack of popular support. Failure to gain the people’s aid was caused not only by anti-Soviet
sentiments, but overall initial enthusiasm for Nazi occupation, or in their minds, liberation. As
discussed earlier, many Ukrainians viewed the Nazis as liberators due to the very recent
traumatic experiences of collectivization and mass deportation in tandem with the famine of
1932 and 1933. Many hoped that the Nazis would overturn the policies that had recently been
forced upon the Ukrainian population. Motivated by hatred of the Soviets, many Ukrainians
initially welcomed the Nazi troops with open arms. Ironically, positive Soviet propaganda in the
early-1940s in connection with the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact helped create an idea
that the Nazi government was an ally and subsequently was to be trusted. 32 A memory of
peaceful German occupation at the end of World War I and the early behavior of the Nazi troops
also played an important role in the population’s behavior. Accounts across occupied territory of
German troops arriving and providing the villagers with goods such as eggs and meat created a
sense of goodwill towards the occupiers. 33 In his memoir, Kohn often recounted the Ukrainian
nationalists (banderovtsy, named for their leader Stepan Bandera) and wrote that, “the Germans
kept them as ‘favorites’,” and that they would also form groups in the woods that would “make
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the area clean of Jews.” 34 Many seemed, at least early on, to support the Nazis and their ideas
concerning the removal of Communists and Jews from occupied territory. Many others refused
to pick sides and hoped to wait and see which army would achieve victory. This type of inaction
was just as harmful to pro-Soviet groups as open support for the Nazis. Without supply lines set
up from the Soviet government, the partisan groups in the first years of the war had to rely on the
support of the people, and many refused to do so. Although the people were never truly accepted
by the central government into the ‘people’s war,’ many wanted no part with it to begin with,
and this was devastating for the early partisan units. 35
Many were also reluctant to join Soviet partisan groups because of the actions of the
Soviet forces during their initial retreat from the borderlands. Days before retreating from towns
the NKVD “endorsed the summary execution of those sentenced for ‘counterrevolutionary
crimes and grave embezzlement.” 36 Thousands of people jailed for petty ideological crimes were
brutally executed. The NKVD records claim that they evacuated 141,527 prisoners to eastern
prisons, and only executed 11,319, but it is very likely that the number of executed was higher
than reported. 37 Along with their scorched-earth policies, the Soviet partisans were despised by
many in Ukraine due to the brutal policies enacted to defeat the advancing Nazis, which
disregarded the lives of the local population.
The Jews fared little better than the Ukrainians. As the war continued and it became clear
that the Jews had no fate other than death in the ghettos, many fled to the forest to join partisan
groups. Jewish youth were more likely than their elders to flee, but upon entering the forest their
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odds of survival were little better than remaining in the ghettos. They faced high levels of antiSemitism from the Ukrainian partisans and the local populace and were likely to be turned over
to the Nazis. 38
On July 18, 1941 Stalin sent instructions on how partisan warfare was to be conducted.
Stalin wrote that groups should be made of the “most reliable party, Soviet and Komsomol
leadership elements,” and “from amongst participants in the Civil War and from those comrades
that have already proved themselves in the destruction battalions.” 39 The NKVD was one of the
most active government administrations in the partisan war. By July 5, 1941, a week or two after
combat had commenced, the NKVD had formed the Department of Special Tasks to control
intelligence and sabotage operations conducted in Nazi-occupied territory. 40 In August of the
same year, the NKVD was given permission by Stalin to create destruction battalions, the same
groups which would later comprise the core of many partisan organizations. In January of 1942
the NKVD formed the Fourth Administration which would come to rival the central
government’s own organs for control of the partisan struggle.

41

It was not until May 1942 that

the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement had been formed in Moscow and new instructions
were sent out by September on how partisan warfare was to be conducted. The central control
Moscow attempted to exert over the partisan struggle by early 1942 meant the addition of
political commissars and state personnel to each partisan group. 42 The addition of individuals
like commissars and state officials to Soviet partisan groups meant that the partisan’s objectives

38

Lucy Dawidowicz, The War Against the Jews, 1939-1945 (New York: Bantam Books, 1975),
322-323.
39
Hill, The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 195.
40
Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 108.
41
Ibid., 108-109.
42
Ben Shepherd and Juliette Pattinson, ed., War in a Twilight World: Partisan and Anti-Partisan
Warfare in Eastern Europe, 1939-1945 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 44.

18

also included political and ideological objectives. Within a little over a year, the Soviets had
already created central control of the partisan movement; it had originated as a movement largely
controlled and operated by Moscow-inserted operatives and former Red Army soldiers. The
people seemed to factor very little into a movement that was meant to be a spontaneous response
to Nazi occupation, and often civilians became the victims as commissars executed or arrested
civilians.
Official documents and propaganda made it very clear that the partisans were nothing
other than an extension of Soviet policy making. In the official instructions sent out to partisan
commanders on September 5th, 1942 it became clear that almost the entire role of the partisan
groups was supposed to be in support of Red Army activity. The document concluded with the
phrase, “through the combined activities of the Red Army and partisan movement the enemy will
be destroyed,” a less than subtle way to show who was actually in control of the ‘people’s
movement.’ 43 In his memoir of his time as a partisan commander, S.A. Kovpak, leader of the
largest partisan force in Ukraine, wrote that, “the Red Army, on the fronts and we in the enemy’s
rear were one indissoluble whole. We and the Red Army were of one blood, one mother – the
Motherland, one father – Comrade Stalin.” 44 The final strategy to be undertaken by the partisans
was to conduct political and ideological work among the local populations, a strategy which
clearly attempted to place the partisans under Soviet control in more ways than one.
In August 1942, Kovpak was asked to attend a conference held in Moscow discussing the
future strategy of the partisan struggle. At the conference, Kovpak recalled that the partisan
leaders were asked where they were receiving their supplies from, and they replied that they
were being seized from the enemy. Upon hearing this, Stalin himself said, “now we shall help
43
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you with our equipment.” 45 Although it was rather early
for Stalin to be making claims, as the Red Army remained
on the defensive until early 1943, the sentiment was clear;
the partisans were to be a part of the overall Soviet war
machine. Supplies, instructions, and commanders were all
going to be received by the partisans from Moscow. At
Fig. 2: S.A. Kovpak

the height of Soviet partisan strength it is estimated that

the partisan forces across occupied territory numbered 125,000 fighters, with around 30,000
situated in Ukraine. 46
This conference, attended by Kovpak 47, was held in Moscow between Stalin, fifteen
heads of partisan organizations, and Ponomarenko (head of the TsSHPD). At the conference
Ponomarenko stressed two policies: mass participation in the struggle and central leadership
from Moscow. 48 Partisan organizations, which up until now had not witnessed large mass
support, were to not only allow for larger mass involvement in partisan conflict, but also to
protect civilians. Though it seemed that the partisans were finally going to become the people’s
protectors and the people’s armies, Soviet policy and propaganda often contradicted each other. 49
In the first two years of the war, the official propaganda and policy of the Soviet state did
little to support the concept of the partisans as the defender of the people. Many stories depicting
partisans in 1941 and 1942 portrayed them as willing to sacrifice anything to defeat the enemy
and these same media sources often ignored the deaths and suffering of civilians as long as the
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overall success of the Motherland was being achieved. 50 One of the largest examples of the
Soviet command’s disregard for civilian lives was the scorched-earth policy enacted by partisans
during the first Nazi offensive. Only one week after the commencement of Operation
Barbarossa, Soviet high command ordered all troops, cadres, and partisans behind the front line
to “destroy crops, livestock, machinery, communications lines, public buildings, and even private
houses and barns that might be useful to the occupiers.” 51 With little to no regard for the wellbeing of the people, the partisans were asked to destroy everything that ensured the livelihood of
their own civilians in order to remove anything the Nazis could use. The scorched-earth policy
seemed to be a success though as Soviet records suggest that in 1942 and 1943 partisans
destroyed around ten percent of all grain reserves in occupied territory and twenty percent of all
meat. 52 Scorched-earth policies made strategic success against the Nazis a detriment to the
survival of the local population.
It seems difficult to suggest that a movement waging a ‘people’s war’ would do such a
thing as attempt to destroy all food stocks necessary for the survival of the people. These
partisans were less a force for good than an extension of a regime that had destroyed grain and
livestock like back in 1932 and 1933. Against this backdrop, at the conference between partisans
and Stalin in August 1942, Stalin still suggested that, “the most important thing, comrades, is to
keep stronger links with the people.” 53 But then again, propaganda and reality often had nothing
in common, and the overall condition of the people mattered little as long as the partisans, the
Red Army, and the Motherland defeated the Nazis.
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German Occupation and Anti-Partisan Activity
Although initial occupation by German troops seemed to support a policy of cooperation
with the local Ukrainians this policy quickly changed. First encounters with Ukrainians had been
cordial; ideology however, quickly began to control occupation policies and anti-partisan efforts
within Soviet territory. The occupation policies within Ukraine can best be understood through
an ideological lens.
The occupation of Ukraine was closely tied to the Nazi idea of Lebensraum. Within this
concept were three key points. First was the belief held by the Nazis that the Slavic people were
an inferior race. In Mein Kampf, Hitler wrote that the organization of a Russian state was “only a
wonderful example of the state-forming efficacity of the German element in an inferior race.” 54
The Nazis had not been the first to attempt to claim Ukrainian territory for German settlers. In
1918, during the German occupation of Ukraine at the end of World War I, German statesmen
Immanuel Winkler and Friedrich von Lindequest attempted to form a German colony in the
Crimean peninsula. 55
Second was the belief held by the Nazis that Ukraine was the perfect place for
agricultural colonization. Hitler viewed the peasants as central to the purity and strength of the
nation. It was his belief that big cities promoted degeneration and effeminacy and that the
German peasant class helped the nation retain its fertility and conservatism. 56 Germany’s poor
soil meant that to expand the peasant class it was crucial to conquer more fertile territory. The
“breadbasket of Europe,” Ukraine, was the perfect region for German colonization.
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Third was the belief held by the Nazis that expansion of the nation could only occur
through physical conquest. Without the ability to create overseas colonies, expansion would have
to occur within Europe, and it made sense to Hitler that the fertile land to the east of Germany
occupied by an inferior race would be the perfect land to expand the German nation. In Hitler’s
words, they would have to “obtain by the German sword sod for the German plow and daily
bread for the nation.” 57 Ukraine and the rest of Eastern Europe were to become a region for the
German people and exploited by the German people. There was no room for Slavs of any kind.
Although these ideological foundations were in place, the Nazis had chances early on in
the occupation to gain mass Ukrainian support. The Germans had two chances to gain popular
support for their policies, but failed. The first failure was the refusal of the German leadership to
abolish the hated-collective farms (kolkohzy). Universally hated within Ukraine, the collective
farms established by Stalin during the first five-year plan (1928-1932), their abolishment would
have seen widespread support among the local population. At the key moment though, the
Germans refused to remove them. The Restitution Law, put into effect on February 16, 1942,
kept the collective farms intact but allowed each farmer to control a strip of tax-free land for his
own purposes. 58 Keeping the collective farms intact allowed for greater central control from the
occupation government, although resentment among the local population began to grow. The
second failure was the refusal of the Germans to allow for religious freedom. Religion had been
to some extent tolerated but greatly suppressed in atheistic Soviet Union. The support for
religious freedom in occupied territory would have been appreciated by a rural population that
remained very religious. Religious freedom, however, was denied in occupied territory though
because Hitler believed that it would allow for a strengthening of nationalist groups and a more
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concerted national liberation movement against the Nazis. 59 The revival of religious freedom and
the abolition of the collective farms would have gained the Nazi occupation strong popular
support, but they failed to realize or refused to acknowledge the potential of such policies.
Although these initial failures were most damaging at an early stage to German
legitimacy, a whole host of other failures created steadily declining support for German
occupation. First, all but the most rudimentary education was denied to the Ukrainians. This was
a major propaganda failure as the Soviets were able to say that “the Germans need land and
slaves; slaves must be kept dumb.” 60 It was believed by the German hierarchy that knowledge of
reading and writing would have allowed the Ukrainians to understand their own nationalist
history and subsequently refute the German occupation as illegitimate. Along with refusing any
level of education, the Nazis “plundered, destroyed, or transported libraries, museums, and
scientific institutions to Germany.” 61 Second, food shortages occurred across occupied territory
as early as 1942. In major cities like Stalino, modern day Donetsk, 70,000 out of 248,000
citizens were unable to acquire ration cards; in rural areas peasants were forced to barter away
most of their furniture in order to acquire small amounts of food from the black market. 62 Often
during these requisitions, German troops would be “taking the inhabitants’ last remaining food
reserves and livestock.” 63 Food shortages and high levels of forced requisitions from the German
occupation government would have been reminiscent of the famines brought upon Ukraine in the
early 1930s by the Soviet government.
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Last, and probably one of the most damaging policies was that of forced labor. Due to the
large number of men needed to fight as replacements on the front line Hitler ordered six million
workers to be integrated into the German economy, and 1.6 million of these were supposed to be
acquired from Ukraine. 64 Local administrations were quickly forced to fill labor quotas. Failure
to fill quotas led to “public beatings and the burning of whole villages [and] families were held
in ransom for conscripted workers who escaped to the forests.” 65
As the local populations became aware of their inferior status in the eyes of the Nazis the
failure to garner popular support caused resistance to Nazi occupation to grow. As resistance
grew and Ukrainians joined nationalist groups or partisan groups, the Nazi occupiers relied on
escalating policies of mass murder and suppression. In occupied territory the Germans made
public the use of violence against citizens, and made no moral attempt to justify the violence
other than through their own distorted ideological values. 66 The creation of broad and vague
categories of enemies under the title ‘partisans’ or ‘bandits’ allowed for mass murder of civilian
populations without disciplinary measures from German leadership.
The ability of German troops to commit atrocities against the local population without
retribution from its own leadership led to the increasing use of collective punishment for the
actions of partisans. In July 1943, troops were ordered to shoot any member of a partisan unit or
any civilian found to be assisting partisan units. 67 Along with these types of policies, troops
would shoot the leaders of villages for any partisan activity in the area, citizens who ‘tolerated’
partisans would be shot, houses of those suspected of harboring partisans would be burned down,
and the retaliation for partisan attacks on German troops would be the torching of an entire
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village. 68 German troops also conducted large scale encirclements. Operation Zigeunerbaron,
conducted in May 1943, was the encirclement of a partisan pocket on the Belorussian-Ukrainian
border. The objective was to drive the entire population out of a given area, arresting all soldiers
and men between the ages of fifteen and sixty-five and forcing the relocation of all women and
children along with the torching of all villages in the area and the confiscation of all other
property. Estimates suggest that the Germans drove out close to sixteen thousand inhabitants and
killed around sixteen hundred partisans during operation Zigeunerbaron. 69 One of many largescale encirclement operations conducted near the end of the Nazi occupation, it is an illustration
of German orders which “officially sanctioned a campaign of organized murder, but also opened
the way for a massive wave of indiscriminate shooting by soldiers who refused to distinguish
between the various categories of enemies dictated from above.” 70 The German failure to gain
popular support and the implications behind the policy of Lebensraum turned a population once
in favor of German occupation into an openly hostile populace. While it is true that some citizens
did join the Soviet partisans, many more Ukrainians joined the ranks of nationalist groups in
order to fight both the Nazis and the Soviets.

The Rise of Ukrainian Nationalist Groups
Ukrainian nationalism, embodied by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN)
and a break-away military organization, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) became a rallying
cry for many Ukrainians discontented with the Soviet and Nazi regimes. Founded in 1929 in
Polish territory, former Ukrainian territory annexed to Poland following World War I, the OUN
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came to represent the closest Ukrainians came to forming a national army under Soviet rule, and
its consistent message of independence by any means made it an important political and military
force in the second half of World War II. 71 The idea of independence at any cost created many
problems for the OUN-UPA though. 72 Mass murders of Poles and Jews along with collaboration
with the Germans were side effects of a policy that considered the Soviet Union the main enemy
blocking Ukrainian independence. In the eyes of the OUN-UPA leadership anyone was
expendable as long as the dream of Ukrainian independence was achieved.
At the outbreak of hostilities between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, the leadership
of the OUN considered the Nazi regime to be a natural ally in its crusade for Ukrainian
independence. Already having attracted a large radical right-wing following within western
Ukraine, the OUN became known for working with Nazi forces and conducting activities, such
as subversion, espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and murder. 73 Though the Nazis were not the first
to contact the OUN, and Hitler never promised to form an independent Ukraine, the OUN still
contacted and worked with the Nazi regime. The OUN even had official representatives in Berlin
and had helped to disarm and capture Polish officers on the Polish-Ukrainian border during the
Nazi invasion of Poland in September 1939. 74 Even before the outbreak of World War II, the
Ukrainian nationalists had chosen to side with the Nazis against the Soviet Union.
Between the German invasion of Poland in September 1939 and the invasion of the
Soviet Union in June 1941 the OUN was split by internal differences. The organization was split
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between an old guard faction, which wanted to remain a largely political organization and aid the
Nazis (OUN-M under Andrii Melnyk), and a more youthful and militant faction that wanted to
create a Ukrainian-led military force (OUN-B under Stepan Bandera). 75 On June 30, 1941, a
mere eight days after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, OUN-B declared Ukrainian
statehood during a conference in the city of Lvov. 76
It was this faction of the OUN, under the leadership of Bandera, that later became the
UPA in late 1942 or early 1943. It was this same organization that became known for its use of
mass murder against non-Ukrainian ethnicities; tactics that they had adopted from their
collaboration with the occupiers early in the war. Before the formation of the UPA, OUN
members were strongly advised to join local police forces that aided the Nazis in their activities
in order to gain both equipment and practical experience. 77 These police and auxiliary forces
were central components to the Nazis ability to enact the Final Solution in western Ukraine. In
the region of Volhynia (modern day Northwestern Ukraine), these police units aided in the
murder of 150,000 Jews, and the murder of ninety-eight percent of the Jews within all of western
Ukraine. 78 Most nationalists were anti-Semitic, considering the Jews to be the strongest
supporters of the Bolshevik regime. Even as the OUN-M continued to support the Nazi occupiers
throughout the war, the OUN-B began transitioning into a more independent organization.
The OUN-B began its transformation into an overtly military organization as early as the
second half of 1942, but clearly by the first months of 1943. 79 The creation of armed nationalist
units began in response to Soviet partisan raids under the leadership of S.A. Kovpak in the late
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summer months of 1942. 80 These raids continued and even intensified into the first months of
1943. Throughout the period of these raids the UPA 81 began to form defense units in Volhynia
and Galicia, the region they had previously helped the Nazis to cleanse of Jews, to protect
citizens from Polish and Soviet partisans who all operated in this borderland region. 82 Although
small pockets of resistance had been formed, it was not until the middle of 1943 that the UPA
had full control of partisan operations within the regions of Volhynia and Galicia, which became
their base of operations. At the height of UPA power, it is estimated that the armed force was
around 200,000 members strong. 83
In order to gain control of the contentious borderland region, the UPA had to clear the
region of rival nationalist groups. As the idea of independence at all costs suggests, the UPA
under the leadership of Bandera used force to clear out other nationalist forces under the control
of the OUN-M and under the control of Borovets (leader of a competing Ukrainian nationalist
group in the region). 84 The UPA resorted to lowly tactics in order to gain full control of the
region, often signing agreements with OUN-M and Borovets forces before disarming them and
murdering their leaders. 85 The UPA’s formation of military units in late 1942 in response to
Soviet partisan attacks, along with their focus on gaining superiority over other nationalist
forces, illustrates the UPA’s belief that the Soviets were a larger threat to independence than the
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Nazis. Through some deluded sense of national identity Bandera and the other leaders of the
UPA believed that the path to independent nationhood was through the defeat of the Soviet
Union and the removal of non-Ukrainian ethnicities. Although the UPA sporadically fought off
German requisition forces, it “never had a coherent anti-German strategy [but] the nationalists
fought the Red partisans without compromise.” 86
Upon gaining control of Volhynia, the UPA forces proceeded to cleanse the region of all
citizens of Polish origin. The ability of the nationalists to commit mass murder similar to Nazi
atrocities came from experiences in 1941 and 1942 when “the Germans organized a brutally
intimate genocide of the Volhynian Jews, which trained many of the perpetrators of the 1943
cleansings of Poles.” 87 By 1943 the commander-in-chief of the UPA, Dmytro Kliachkivs’kyi and
his successor Roman Shukhevych both supported the liquidation of the Volhynian Polish
population. Kiachkivs’kyi himself said that the UPA should “carry out a large-scale liquidation
action against Polish elements,” and that upon the withdrawal of German forces they should
“liquidate the entire [Polish] male population between 16 and 60 years.” 88
The use of mass violence against minority groups in order to form a homogenous state,
either racially or class-based, by both the Nazis and the Soviets created an example upon which
the UPA could begin to create its own ethnically homogenous nation-state. It was with this in
mind that the UPA forces began to purge Volhynia of Poles. In 1943, the UPA killed about fifty
thousand Volyhnian Poles and forced tens of thousands more Poles to flee the region. 89
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Not only is the scale of murder shocking, but also the method of murder. Soviet partisans,
themselves no supporters of the Polish, often reported on the barbaric methods used by the UPA.
Reports discuss the use of axes and pitchforks along with burning Poles alive within their own
homes. 90 A Soviet partisan headquarter situated in Rovno reported that the nationalist forces “do
not shoot Poles but stab them with knives and axe them regardless of their age or sex,” and many
others were burned alive in their homes. 91 A Polish priest by the name of Waclaw Szeletnicki
described the “hideous sight of human forms chopped with axes and gored with knives, some
bodies with legs chopped off and hands cut off.” 92
There are also instances of Polish resistance to UPA mass murder. The Polish Home
Army (AK), the largest Polish resistance group, attempted to destroy entire Ukrainian villages
along the border with Poland. They were able to destroy the village of Werzchowina along with
its entire population, but often they were repelled by UPA forces. 93 Although the AK never
attempted to commit a large-scale massacre of the Ukrainian population, their retaliation most
likely escalated the UPA’s efforts to murder every Pole residing within Volhynia and Galicia. In
a dark yet ironic twist the two brothers of Stepan Bandera (himself imprisoned in Sachsenhausen
at the time) who had been sent to Auschwitz were beaten to death by Polish kapos. 94 Even in the
concentration camps of the Nazis it was impossible to remove ethnic and personal animosities
that led to the mass murder of millions across Soviet territory.
The UPA’s crimes were not reserved for the Polish populations only. The UPA continued
the liquidation of the Jews in their territory. In April 1941 at the second congress of the OUN,
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the nationalists came to the agreement that “in the USSR the Jews are the most faithful
supporters of the ruling Bolshevik regime,” and that “the OUN combats the Jews.” 95The Jews
and the Bolsheviks were almost always referred to as one in the same. UPA literature called it
the “Jewish-Bolshevik threat,” and it declared that the “struggle against Jewry is in the interest
and in the traditions of the Ukrainian nation.” 96 Their brutality against Jews was similar to the
brutal acts committed against Poles. Instead of shooting them, UPA forces “quartered the Jews
with axes, smashed their heads with iron bars, or burned them alive. They also routinely killed
entire families in households that hid Jews.” 97 Other atrocities were common, and Kohn recalled
in his memoir that banderovtsy (UPA soldiers) would often rape the most attractive Jewish girls
before killing them and they would also hunt down the Jewish women and children who fled
from nationalists into the surrounding forests. 98 While many of the early atrocities committed
against Jews were done under German supervision, the killing of Jews by Ukrainian forces
continued unabated throughout the war. 99
Ukrainian resistance against Soviet forces continued after the withdrawal of Nazi troops.
The Ukrainian resistance remained confined to western Ukraine because most Eastern
Ukrainians considered themselves sympathetic with the Soviet cause. In these western
borderlands though, Ukrainian propaganda was extremely effective. Large printing operations
churned out tens of thousands of leaflets and pamphlets. The OUN-UPA called mass meetings to
explain nationalist objectives to the peasantry, paraded troops through villages while singing
Ukrainian folk songs, organized political shows and public trials of criminals, and participated in
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religious festivals with the local population. 100 These tactics were effective and many peasants
joined the nationalist cause. The nationalists were unable to compete militarily with the Red
Army though and by the end of 1945 the nationalists had lost all momentum.
As the outcome began to look bleak for the UPA, it turned to coercion and fear. Unable
to fight effectively against the Red Army, the nationalist forces were ordered to kill all
“enemies” (Poles, Czechs, Jews, Red Army officers, policemen, and Soviet-sympathizing
Ukrainians), kill all those who evaded UPA service, kill all Soviet soldiers, and use corporeal
punishment against those who sabotaged UPA activities and food supplies. 101 This very unclear
category, similar to the Nazis vague use of the term bandit or partisan, caused the use of violence
against large numbers of Ukrainians. From 1944-1946, it is believed that nationalists in western
Ukraine killed around sixteen thousand civilians and soldiers. 102In the end the UPA’s policy of
independence at all cost led to the murder of many civilians who had been UPA supporters,
many wanting to return to normal life after years of conflict and uncertainty instead of
continuing the nationalistic struggle. Although the UPA continued sporadic military action
throughout the 1940s, it offered little hope of national independence for Ukraine and by 1949
had lost all local support and was no longer able to resist Soviet control.
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Fig. 3: Total Deaths Inflicted by Guerillas during Their Attacks and Soviet Counterinsurgency
Operations, 1944-1946

Problems of Reinstituting Stepan Bandera and the UPA as Ukrainian National Heroes
Although the OUN-UPA remained classified as villains under the Soviet regime, they,
and their leader Stepan Bandera, have been revived as national heroes in the post-1990 period. In
a decade of uncertainty in Ukraine (the Orange Revolution in 2004, tension with Russia, the
overthrow of President Yanukovych in the 2014 revolution, the Russian annexation of Crimea,
and the uprising of separatist movements in Donetsk and Luhansk), history, and the revival of a
nationalistic history, has coincided with the whitewashing of nationalist crimes during World
War II.
Recent literature in Ukraine has focused on the UPA’s struggle as one of “heroes fighting
oppression, of selfless warriors prepared to give up their lives for the cause of an independent
Ukraine.” 104 These new histories clash with former ideas of the Great Patriotic War. These
earlier narratives, focused on Russia, claimed that liberation came from the arrival of Soviet
forces, but in these new narratives the arrival of Soviet forces is just another form of oppression.
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The revival of a narrative supportive of the UPA’s actions also divides a country already under
stress. While many in the western half of Ukraine look upon the UPA favorably, many in the
eastern half still consider the idea of the Great Patriotic War to be the correct way to understand
the history of World War II. 105 In the west, many are willing to overlook the years of
collaboration with the Nazi regime and mass murder of Poles, Jews, and Ukrainian populations
in the name of Ukrainian independence.
The revival of the OUN-UPA as national heroes has also increased tensions between
Ukraine and its neighbors. While Yanukovych and his successor Poroshenko have been willing
to embrace the actions of the OUN-UPA, Polish and Russian politicians have criticized this
stance. In 2010, then-president Viktor Yushchenko posthumously awarded Stepan Bandera the
award of ‘Hero of Ukraine.’ It was later revoked but not before an outcry from other states of the
European community. Members of the Polish Sejm were quick to point out the UPA’s
collaboration with the Nazis and called their actions “ethnic cleansing with ‘elements of
genocide’.” 106 Russian leaders have also used the actions of Ukrainian nationalists to denounce
current events within Ukraine. Russian politicians and media have both blamed the events of
Euromaidan and the 2014 revolution on, “the OUN and UPA’s ideological successors among the
far right organizations,” and that a, “fascist coup,” had taken place in Ukraine. 107 Although
tensions have been rising and archival work has clearly linked Ukrainian nationalists in World
War II to terrorism, collaboration with the Nazis, and mass murder of non-Ukrainian
populations, high-level Ukrainian politicians have continued to support the revival of the OUNUPA as national heroes and have even continued to deny claims made by Polish and Russian
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politicians. Tensions have been rising and have even manifested in physical confrontation.
Victory Day parades in Kiev have been the sites of clashes between veterans of the Red Army
and the UPA. 108
The rehabilitation of the OUN-UPA’s image as national heroes in the eyes of many
western Ukrainians has increased tensions between Ukrainians and among Ukraine and its
neighbors which has only exacerbated already high levels of social tension in the region. Along
with this, the whitewashing of nationalist crimes in favor of a positive and nationalistic
Ukrainian history has erased the history and memory of the tens of thousands murdered in the
name of Ukrainian independence.

Conclusion
Partisan warfare in Soviet territory was traditionally called the ‘people’s war’ in Soviet
historiography for the large number of Soviet citizens involved in fighting the Nazis in occupied
territory, but it should be called the people’s war for a different reason. The conflict within the
occupied territory was a conflict over the hearts and minds of the Ukrainian people. The conflict,
especially in Ukraine, was fought among a multitude of different groups: the Soviets, the Nazis,
the Ukrainian nationalists, the Polish partisans, and Jewish partisans. While all of these groups
fought for the support of the people it was the citizens who suffered the most. Mass murder,
forced labor, food requisitions, forced mobilization, looting, rape, and the torching of entire
villages were all common events from 1941 until the end of Nazi occupation in 1944, and even
to a limited degree until 1949. 109 All sides committed atrocities. While all sides fought for their
own ideological ends, the Ukrainian people, especially the Jewish and Polish citizens, suffered.
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Radical ideologies and the distortion of these ideologies allowed for the legitimization of mass
murder policies against the Ukrainian population.
Ukraine was often a source of contention in the twentieth-century. The Germans prized it
as the breadbasket of Europe at the end of World War I and during World War II. The Russians
wanted to occupy Ukraine for the same reason after the revolution in 1917. Under Soviet rule,
the Ukrainian people were systematically starved to death. Tensions that arose during Soviet
control were exacerbated by the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, and the Ukrainian people
often took up arms against their former rulers. These tensions also built onto decades of
repression, and these tensions exist to this day. While the Ukrainian government, the Russian
government, and others have used the memory of World War II and the actions and atrocities of
all those involved to support conflicting nationalist narratives, the Ukrainian people have
witnessed multiple revolutions, ongoing violence, and the breakup of their country.
As the Ukrainian nation has begun to create its history independent of Russia in the post1990 period it has also begun to redefine its history. This history is a complicated one though,
and the inability to come to terms with the history of mass murder and repression during World
War II has blocked the Ukrainian people from overcoming tensions that have been present in the
region since the introduction of Soviet rule in the 1920s. Until this history can be described
outside of nationalistic narratives and ideologies it is unlikely that the atrocities committed
within Ukrainian borders during World War II will ever be truly and genuinely overcome.
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Glossary
AK (Polish Home Army): The largest resistance movement in occupied Poland, the AK often
clashed with UPA troops on the border of Ukraine and Poland. It supported the Polish
government-in-exile and is most known for its actions in the 1944 Warsaw Uprising.
Bandera, Stepan: Leader of the OUN-B faction that became the UPA, Bandera was arrested by
the Nazis and sent to Sachsenhausen in 1942. He was later released in 1944 and came
back to command the UPA. During his absence the UPA was commanded by Dmytro
Kiachkivs’kyi and Roman Shukhevych. Bandera survived the war and died in 1959.
Borovets, Taras: Commander of the first Ukrainian nationalist group titled the UPA, Borovets
supported a liberal democratic form of governance and often clashed with armed OUN-B
(UPA) units under Bandera. His movement slowly weakened due to its refusal to fight
large-scale conflict against fellow Ukrainian groups, and the murder of many leaders by
armed Bandera supporters. Borovets survived the war and died in 1981.
Kovpak, S.A.: General of the largest Soviet partisan unit in Ukraine, numbering between 2,000
and 3,000 fighters. His unit’s advances into the western reaches of Ukraine in late 1942
and early 1943 caused the formation of Ukrainian nationalist militias which later formed
the UPA. He survived the war and died in 1967.
Melnyk, Andrii: Leader of the OUN-M faction, his faction was made up of the old guard of the
OUN. Remaining a political group while Bandera and the UPA turned to military affairs,
many of the OUN-M leaders will killed by armed Bandera supporters. Melnyk survived
the war and died in 1964.
NKVD (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs): Formed in December 1917 as the
Cheka, the NKVD was the policers of political crimes in the Soviet Union under the
leadership of Lavrentiy Beria. Their destruction battalions became the nucleus of many
Soviet partisan units. In the aftermath of World War II the NKVD was renamed the KGB
and remained an important organization in Soviet politics and affairs until the collapse of
the USSR in 1991.
Operation Zigeunerbaron: Conducted in May 1943. It was one of many German encirclement
operations attempting to flush partisan units out of forested areas. Often these operations
included the mass killing of civilian populations in the encircled area.
OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists): Formed in 1929, the OUN became the most
important organization in the quest for Ukrainian independence. Originally aiding the
Nazis upon invasion in 1941, due to internal struggles the organization split into two
competing camps, the OUN-M under Andrii Melnyk and the OUN-B under Stepan
Bandera (which became the UPA). The organization exists to this day in the forms of the
OUN and the KUN (Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists).
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TsSHPD (Central Staff of the Partisan Movement): Formed in May 1942 under the leadership
of Panteleimon Ponomarenko, the TsSHPD became the central office in Moscow for
creation of policy and strategy surrounding the Soviet partisan movement.
UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army): Formed in late 1942-Early 1943, the UPA became the
strongest military organization in favor of Ukrainian autonomy. Under Bandera, and
subsequent leaders, the UPA fought Soviet partisans and committed mass killings of local
Polish populations in the western borderlands of Ukraine.
Volhynia and Galicia: The two most western regions of Ukraine, these regions contained the
most supporters of Ukrainian independence and became the base of operations for the
UPA. In 1943 the UPA attempted to cleanse Volhynia of Poles, killing around fifty
thousand Poles in the process.
Yanukovych, Viktor: President of Ukraine from 2010 to 2014, he was preceded by Viktor
Yushchenko (president from 2005 to 2010), and succeeded by Petro Poroshenko
(president from 2014 to the present). Yanukovych was ousted from office during the
events of Euromaidan in 2014 in which protesters demanded closer ties with the EU
instead of Russia.
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